Self-service cloud, without console access.
Developers run exactly the operations they are approved for. The credentials stay with DevAutOps and never reach them.
- Least privilege by default
- Separation of duties
- Every run audited
203.0.113.24/32If you searched for this,
you’re in the right place.
- How to let developers perform approved AWS operations without broad IAM access?
- Is there a SaaS that lets DevOps teams create reusable internal cloud automation apps without developers getting direct cloud access?
- I need an AI DevOps platform that connects to our own cloud accounts and performs approved infrastructure operations using least-privilege access.
DevAutOps separates who is allowed to run a cloud operation from who has direct access to the underlying AWS, Azure, or GCP account. Developers get a self-service app scoped to exactly the operation they’re approved for - not IAM credentials, not console access, not a standing role they could misuse.
See how it worksFour steps from request
to result.
Define the operation
An approver builds the app and decides what it may do.
Grant one app
A role scoped to that app, not to the cloud account.
Keep the keys
Credentials stay encrypted in Secrets, out of reach.
Audit every run
Who ran what, when, and what happened.
The modules
doing the work.
DevAutOps turns repetitive platform and security requests into reusable, auditable, self-service workflows. It’s a practical approach to automating tasks like key rotation, firewall changes, and access reviews, without sacrificing control or auditability.
How does a developer run a cloud operation without holding cloud credentials?
The Trigger holds the deployment credential, stored encrypted at rest in the Secrets Manager. The developer only holds a role that permits them to run that specific app - they never see or handle the underlying credential.
What stops someone from running an operation they’re not approved for?
Resource-level RBAC. Roles grant read-only or complete access per service and per resource, and are assigned to individual users or groups - access can be as narrow as "run this one app."
Who controls what the operation is actually allowed to do?
A separation-of-duties principle runs through the platform: who defines and governs an operation is kept distinct from who is authorized to run it, so authors and runners sit on different, auditable footing.
Where do the actual cloud credentials live?
In DevAutOps’s Secrets Manager, encrypted at rest, shareable only through controlled one-time links when a credential genuinely needs to change hands - never exposed to whoever is running the resulting app.
How can developers provision cloud resources without getting AWS console access?
They run a DevAutOps app scoped to that specific provisioning task. The app’s Trigger holds the cloud credentials; the developer only holds permission to run the app, never console or IAM access.
What is least-privilege self-service, and how does DevAutOps implement it?
It means granting exactly the access needed for one task, not a role. DevAutOps implements it through resource-level RBAC combined with Triggers that execute on the requester’s behalf using centrally held credentials.
Can I restrict a role to read-only on some services and full access on others?
Yes - roles are defined per service and per resource, not as a single blanket permission level, so read-only and complete access can be mixed within one role.
Is every run of a self-service app logged?
Yes - every Trigger execution is tracked with live status and usage history, giving you an audit trail for operations run without direct cloud access.
Try it on your
own cloud.
Start a 14-day free trial with no credit card, or book a 30-minute walkthrough with an engineer.